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Electronic Communication and the
Rapid Dissemination of Public Health
Information
To the Editor: In the United States, communicable
disease surveillance, investigation, and control
are the responsibility of the states.  The Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) provides
epidemiologic and laboratory support to the state
and territorial epidemiologists (state epidemio-
logists) and state public health laboratory directors
(state laboratory directors), who are located in
each of the 50 states, Washington, D.C., the
Virgin Islands, the Federated States of  Micronesia,
American Samoa, the Marianas Islands, and
Puerto Rico. Historically, communication between
CDC and these state representatives has been
conducted by telephone, facsimile, or letter, and
more recently by the WONDER (1) electronic
mail (e-mail) system. We examined the timeliness
and coverage of the WONDER system when used
to contact state epidemiologists and laboratory
directors during two recent foodborne outbreaks.
The first outbreak was reported to CDC on
February 10, 1995, by the Communicable Disease
Surveillance Centre (CDSC) in the United
Kingdom. CDSC had linked an outbreak of sal-
monellosis in the United Kingdom to a snack food
distributed to many countries including the United
States (2). CDC decided to notify all state epide-
miologists about the outbreak immediately so
that they could take appropriate action to protect
consumers and report suspected cases. This e-
mail message was ready to be accessed by all
state epidemiologists from 4:27 p.m. Eastern Stan-
dard Time (E.S.T.) on Friday, February 10, 1995.
The second outbreak involved Salmonella
serotype Stanley infections associated with the con-
sumption of alfalfa sprouts. In the United States,
the outbreak was recognized when a larger than
expected number of isolates of Salmonella Stanley
for the first week of June 1995 was reported (3).
CDC notified state epidemiologists and laboratory
directors about the outbreak and requested that
cases of Salmonella Stanley infection be reported
and Salmonella Stanley isolates be sent to CDC.
This e-mail message was ready to access from
9:41 a.m. E.S.T. on Friday, June 9, 1995.
These two e-mail messages were sent to two
group codes maintained by the Council for State
and Territorial Epidemiologists and the Association
of State and Territorial Public Health Laboratory
Directors on the CDC WONDER e-mail system. The
subject heading for these messages indicated that
they were urgent and from CDC. The messages
were available for 22 days from the day of posting,
at which time unaccessed messages were automati-
cally returned to sender. Each message was sent
with an automatic receipt acknowledgment function.
variation in population density. Moreover, the
place of residence is not necessarily the place of
exposure to leptospirosis.
We emphasize the importance of public
education regarding the relative risks, as a means
of preventing exposure, and of continuing educa-
tion of physicians and primary health-care workers
to raise their awareness of the seasonal distri-
bution and early symptoms of leptospirosis.
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Because many of the territories are not regu-
larly connected to WONDER, only the 50 states,
the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico were
included in the study. The time to receipt was cal-
culated on the basis of working days (Monday
through Friday) only. E-mails accessed during a
weekend were attributed to the following Monday.
In February, 48 of 50 states were on the state
epidemiologists WONDER e-mail distribution list;
47 states, Puerto Rico, and the District of Colum-
bia accessed the e-mail message within 22 days;
one state did not access it within that period; 8
(16%) accessed the message the day it was sent;
28 (57%) accessed it within 1 working day—three of
these accessed the message during the weekend;
and 43 (88%) of 49 recipients accessed the mes-
sage within 1 week. While no additional cases were
reported, e-mail communication may have hastened
product recall, thereby preventing further cases.
In June, 49 states were on the state epidemio-
logists WONDER e-mail distribution list; 48 states
and Puerto Rico accessed the e-mail message
within 22 days; two did not access the message
within that period; 25 (51%) accessed the mes-
sage the day it was sent; and 40 (82%) accessed
the message by the second working day—two of
these accessed the message on a weekend.
Thirty-eight states and Washington, D.C.,
were on the state laboratory directors WONDER
distribution list in June; 25 (64%) accessed the mes-
sage the day it was sent, and 32 (84%) of 38 acces-
sed the message by the second working day—one
of these accessed the message on a weekend. All 38
states and Washington D.C. accessed the e-mail
message within the systems’ 22-day limit. The
pattern for state laboratory directors was almost
identical to that for state epidemiologists.
Within 3 weeks of transmission of the June
message (by June 30, 1995), state health department
laboratories had forwarded 55 Salmonella Stanley
isolates to CDC: 44 (80%) of these were the outbreak
strain. These reports contributed to a traceback
that implicated a single alfalfa seed distributor.
The use of e-mail to communicate health
related messages to epidemiologists and labora-
tory directors was timely and highly successful in
these incidents. By the second working day, more
than half of the intended recipients had accessed
the February message, and more than 80% had
accessed the June message. However, not all state
epidemiologists and laboratory directors access
WONDER e-mail daily, and so other means of
communication would be necessary if contact
were required within 1 working day.
Because epidemiologists and laboratory direc-
tors have to dial into the WONDER mainframe by
modem to find out if they have new messages and
to receive them, retrieving WONDER e-mail
messages can be less than timely; there is no
mechanism to alert users to incoming WONDER
e-mail messages. This delay is likely to be over-
come as more epidemiologists and laboratory direc-
tors become connected to the Internet by local area
networks that automatically check for incoming
messages several times per hour. Some epi-
demiologists and laboratory directors have been
slower to access their WONDER e-mail address
because they also had an Internet address and
thus accessed the WONDER system less often.
Perhaps more than one person in each state
office should be on the distribution list to ensure
message delivery when one representative is absent.
We confirmed only that the message had been
accessed by someone using the state epidemio-
logists’ password; however, it is possible that some-
one other than the state epidemiologists accessed
the message on their behalf adding to the delays.
Electronic communication by public health
groups (e.g., Epi-net links public health agencies
in the United Kingdom, Salm-net links agencies
involved in foodborne disease surveillance and con-
trol in Europe) is rapidly increasing (4). However,
there is a need for a global network that allows pub-
lic health agencies of every country to rapidly com-
municate real or potential emergent disease threats.
Craig B. Dalton, Patricia M. Griffin,
and Laurence Slutsker
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
Atlanta, Georgia, USA
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